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a b s t r a c t
Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) based fault tree analysis algorithms are among the most efﬁcient ones.
They allow performing exact probabilistic analyses, as well as to derive a Zero-suppressed BDD (ZBDD) to
efﬁciently encode Signiﬁcant Prime Implicants (PI) or Minimal Cut Sets (MCS).
The present paper describes a dynamic labelling method for BDD/ZBDD to analyse non-coherent fault
trees. An L-BDD is a BDD in which the information about the variable type is associated to each node.
This information is useful to select, for each node, the corresponding algorithms for performing the
probabilistic analysis and for determining PI or MCS.
When the computational resources are not sufﬁcient to complete the BDD construction, it is
convenient to construct the ZBDD directly from the fault tree. The second part of this paper describes
rules for constructing a Truncated Labelled ZBDD (TL-ZBDD) of non-coherent fault trees.
Results of the analysis of some non-coherent fault trees by means of L-BDD and TL-ZBDD are
provided.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Fault-tree analysis is applied in system reliability to systematically
describe the system's failure logic for each system failure state and to
quantify the corresponding occurrence probability/frequency. Very
efﬁcient analysis algorithms for fault tree analysis are based on the
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD) approach [1–4]. A BDD allows
representing the fault tree logic in a very compact graph embedding
all disjoint cut sets. Hence, the exact probabilistic quantiﬁcation can
be performed without explicitly determining the Minimal Cut Sets
(MCS). According to the typical analysis procedure a fault tree is
stored in the form of an Ordered BDD which is suitable for the exact
quantiﬁcation; then, from the Ordered BDD, a Zero-suppressed BDD
(ZBDD) is derived embedding all MCS in a more efﬁcient way [5].
From the probabilistic point of view the BDD allows performing an
exact probabilistic analysis.
In spite of the superiority of the BDD/ZBDD over all previously
developed analytical approaches, it could happen that the con-
struction of the BDD cannot be completed because of time or space
constraints. This is due to the exponential increase of the number
of nodes with the complexity of the fault tree. The most wide-
spread approach enabling analysis of complex fault trees, and
currently implemented into the majority of fault tree analysers, is
the application of truncation techniques to reduce the working
memory requirement by limiting the analysis to the most sig-
niﬁcant PIs or MCSs. The justiﬁcation for the use of truncation is
based on the practical observation that most of PIs or MCSs give
negligible contribution to the Top-event probability [6]. To analyse
complex coherent fault trees, Jung et al. [7,8] developed a method
allowing the application of truncation during the construction of a
ZBDD embedding Signiﬁcant MCS. This method (T-ZBDD) allows
overcoming the construction of the complete BDD, but has the
disadvantage that:
i) the probabilistic quantiﬁcation cannot be exact, has to rely on e.
g. the rare events approximation methods, and
ii) there is the need to either estimate the truncation error - but there
is no method able to accurately estimate it for large fault trees [9–
11] or to demonstrate that the truncation threshold adopted
reduces the truncation error to a negligible value [11,12].
With the use of truncation care must be exercised to correctly
interpret the results. Indeed, the probabilistic analysis performed
on the basis of a subset of MCS (i.e. SMCS) does not guarantee that
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the result represents an upper bound of the exact Top-event
probability. Therefore the fault tree must be analysed two or more
times with decreasing truncation values until the Top-event
probability shows an almost constant behaviour, i.e. when the
increase of QTOP following further decreases of the probabilistic
cut-off threshold Plim is negligible. In these cases it is possible to
determine upper and lower bounds of QTOP as shown in Section 4
of this paper. Obviously, the lower is the truncation threshold (TT)
the larger is the working memory needed to store resulting ZBDD.
Hence, on very complex fault trees, also the truncation methods
may fail due to insufﬁcient memory.
Recently, new methods have been developed to analyse fault
trees of any complexity, allowing determining upper and lower
bounds [13,14] or exact values [15] of the top event probability;
these methods, however, are not dealt with in this paper.
Fig. 1 summarises the available BDD/ZBDD analysis procedures. The
table associated to the ﬁgure contains, for each link, the type of operation
(truncation / subsuming) that is applied – besides the construction rules
– to obtain the data type represented on the arrow side.
This ﬁgure shows several analysis procedures, along with the
type of result. For instance, the sequence 1-2-3 is the classical one
implemented in many fault tree analysers, i.e. the ordered BDD is
constructed without any truncation and any subsuming, whereas
ZBDD is obtained using subsuming. Finally truncation is applied on
the ZBDD to get SPI or SMCS.
An alternative procedure is 1-4-6, in which the truncation is
applied to the BDD to get a smaller T-BDD from which subsuming
allows obtaining the T-ZBDD embedding SPI or SMCS.
Procedures 5-6 and 7 implement a different approach, consisting
in applying truncation during the construction of T-BDD and T-ZBDD.
Procedure 7 is the one proposed by Jung et al. for coherent fault trees
[7,8], whereas 4 was proposed by Rauzy and Dutuit [6] also for non-
coherent trees. Arguments to perform 5 can be found in [16].
BDD and ZBDD are equally well applicable to efﬁciently analyse
non-coherent fault trees.
The determination of the set of Prime Implicants (PI) requires
the calculation, at each node, of the consensus term (logical
intersection between the two descendants), which is not neces-
sary for coherent fault trees.
Being the determination of the consensus term a time con-
suming operation, it could be advantageous to apply it at node
level only when it is strictly necessary.
The aim of this paper is the description of a technique to
dynamically label each node of the BDD/ZBDD with the informa-
tion about the variable type, so as to identify nodes where the
consensus calculation is needed. In fact in a non-coherent fault
tree different types of variables can be found: coherent (positively
or negatively) and non-coherent. Coherent variables are those that
appear in the fault tree in a single form only (positive or negated)
whereas non-coherent are those variables that appear in both
forms positive and negated. For instance, the function F¼ a cþa b
contains the non-coherent variable a, the negatively-coherent
variable c and the positively-coherent variable b.
It can be shown that in a BDD non-coherent variables can be
represented as coherent. This occurs when the negative (positive)
form of a non-coherent variable never combine with its positive
(negative) occurrence. Hence, a dynamic labelling algorithm has been
developed to add the variable type to the node-variable information.
The construction rules of a Labelled BDD (L-BDD) are the same as
those of a BDD, with the addition of the assignment of the variable
type. Hence BDD and L-BDD have the same number of nodes. Thanks
to the knowledge of the variable type, negatively coherent variable
can be represented in the L-BDD as the positively coherent, i.e. they
are logically dealt with by the same algorithms.
The knowledge about the type of variable in an L-BDD allows
applying, to each node, the most suitable analysis algorithm.
Indeed, at nodes with associated non-coherent variables the
consensus term (intersection between descendants) must be
calculated, whereas this is not needed for coherent variables. Note
that in the classical BDD analysis methods the consensus term is
calculated for each node.
The purpose of this paper is to describe the rules for the
construction and analysis of non-coherent fault trees based on L-
BDD and on L-ZBDD. In this paper application of the direct ZBDD
construction approach to non-coherent fault trees (link 7 in Fig. 1)
is examined. A new method, still based on the application of the
dynamic labelling technique for the construction of the TL-ZBDD
for non-coherent fault trees, is proposed.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes
the labelling techniques applied during the construction of an L-
BDD and its use for the analysis of non-coherent fault trees.
Section 3 provides details on the TL-ZBDD construction formulas
for non-coherent fault trees, whereas Section 4 shows some
experimental results. Finally, discussions and conclusions are
provided in Section 5.
Notation and acronyms
Throughout this paper the following notation is used.
– The logical OR operator of the fault tree is represented as “þ”
whereas the AND is represented as a point or implied.
– Variables (fault tree basic events) are represented in lowercase
letters
– Boolean functions are represented with uppercase letters
– $ used to label negated variables
– & used to label double form variables
Fig. 1. Fault tree analysis procedures based on BDD and ZBDD.
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– Depth-First fault tree Traversing (DFT)
–  represents XOR operator (exclusive OR)
–  represents a Boolean binary operator (e.g. AND, OR, XOR,. )
– BS¼before subsuming
– AS¼after subsuming
– SMCS Signiﬁcant Minimal Cut Set
– SPI Signiﬁcant Prime Implicant
– BDD Binary Decision Diagram
– L-BDD Labelled Binary Decision Diagram
– ZBDD Zero suppressed BDD
– L-ZBDD Labelled ZBDD
– T-BDD Truncated BDD
– TL-BDD Truncated Labelled BDD
– TL-ZBDD Truncated Labelled ZBDD
2. The labelling variables method
2.1. The labelling concept for non-coherent fault tree analysis
2.1.1. Variables type
A non-coherent fault tree contains three different types of
variables [17,18]:
– Single form Positive (SP), i.e. variables appearing in positive
(normal) form only, also referred to as positively coherent;
– Single form Negated (SN), i.e. variables appearing in negated
(complemented) form only, also referred to as negatively
coherent;
– Double form (DF), i.e. variables appearing in both forms
(normal and complemented), also referred to as non-coherent.
For instance, the function F¼ a cþa b contains the DF variable
a, the SN variable c and the SP variable b.
Nodes of the BDD with different types of variables require
different algorithms of analysis. In particular, on nodes with DF
variables, both the determination of the Prime Implicants (PI) and
of the probability of critical states for failure frequency and
importance analysis require the logical intersection between the
left and right descending functions, whereas this is not needed for
the other two types of variables. The logical intersection repre-
sents the consensus term, i.e. A xþB x ¼ A xþB xþA B. Depend-
ing on the complexity of functions A and B the calculation of the
consensus could be expensive from the computational point of
view. Therefore, it seems advantageous to be able to minimise the
number of nodes with DF-type variables.
The information about the type of variables can easily be
extracted from the input fault tree and then associated to the
nodes of the BDD. We shall call this method as “Static Labelling”,
since the association of the node-variable with the variable type is
made after the construction of the BDD [19]. However, a variable of
DF type may also be represented with two or more nodes of the
Ordered BDD in which it behaves as a positive (SP) or as a negative
(SN) variable, the analysis of which requires simpler algorithms. To
identify the nodes with DF-type variables a dynamic association
method has been developed as herewith described.
Since three different types of variables require labelling only
two of them, in this paper SN type variables are labelled with the
symbol “$” and variables of DF type are labelled with the symbol
“&”. In addition, the ordering that will be adopted for labelled
variables during the L-BDD construction is &xoxo$x; the use of
other orderings give the same L-BDD. A simple example of L-BDD
is provided in Fig. 2, representing the function F¼ab in which
both variables are of DF type. Assuming the variables ordering as
aob, the L-BDD representation is shown in Fig. 2(a), whereas
Fig. 2(b) shows the classical BDD. Note that the main difference
between these two representations is due to the negated variable
b. In the L-BDD a negated variable is represented in the same way
as a positive variable, i.e. $x¼1 is equal to x¼0.
In the L-BDD in Fig. 2(a) the variable a is represented as of DF
type, for which the consensus operation is to be performed for
obtaining the prime implicants set, as well as for performing the
probabilistic analysis. This operation is not necessary on the other
two nodes.
Note that in the BDD in Fig. 2(b) all nodes are indistinguishable,
i.e. they all have to be treated as DF-type variables, being based on
the Shannon expansion theorem.
2.1.2. Variables ordering
The number of dynamically identiﬁed DF variables in a BDD
depends on the variables ordering. It can be realised that a
possible way to reduce the number of nodes with DF-type
variables, with respect to the one deﬁned by the Depth-First fault
tree Traversing (DFT), is to assign a lower/higher precedence to DF
variables in the fault tree through a-priori shifting operations, i.e. a
shifting applied to the fault tree before the BDD construction.
To make this statement clearer consider the logical function
F¼ c aþa b, represented, in terms of L-BDD as F¼$c aþ$a b. The
ordering according to the DFT mode is coaob and the corre-
sponding L-BDD is shown in Fig. 3(a). By assigning lower pre-
cedence to the DF variable a, i.e. by shifting it in the last position
among the descendants from logical gates, the function F is
equivalent to F¼$c aþb $a, from which the depth-ﬁrst ordering
is coaob giving the same L-BDD as the previous case. By
assigning higher precedence to a, i.e. by shifting it in the ﬁrst
Fig. 2. L-BDD vs BDD of F¼ab.
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position among the descendants from logical gates, the function F
is expressed as F¼a $cþ$a b, represented by a different L-BDD in
Fig. 3(b) due to the different ordering (aocob).
As can be seen the node with $c (SN-type variable) is repre-
sented and will be dealt with (same algorithms) as b (SP-type
variable). The smaller L-BDD in Fig. 3(b) has been obtained giving
high precedence to DF-type variables a, but the consensus term $c
b must be calculated during the quantiﬁcation. On the contrary,
the L-BDD in Fig. 3(a) is larger because it already embeds the
consensus term.
Experiments performed on many fault trees did not give clear
indications of the advantage of shifting DF-type variables with
respect to the DFT mode.
2.2. Construction of a Labelled BDD
The objective of this section is to provide the main rules for
constructing a labelled BDD of a non-coherent fault tree. Methods
to reduce the cost of the analysis, such as simpliﬁcation, De
Morgan, modularisation [20], re-writing [21] etc., are not consid-
ered in this paper. Therefore the considered functions contain
coherent, non-coherent variables and binary logical operators.
The problem is to construct an L-BDD with the aim to minimise
the number of nodes with DF-type variables.
After setting the ordering of variables (according the DFT
mode), it is known that the classical ordered BDD is constructed
in a bottom-up way by means of the composition of Boolean
functions [4].
Given H¼ ite(lx, Hx¼1, Hx¼0) and K¼ ite(ly, Ky¼1, Ky¼0), which
represent respectively the functions H¼x H1þ$x H0 and K¼y
K1þ$y K0, the following rules are applied (xoy):
– if variables are different, each one maintains its own label, i.e.:
H  K ¼ iteðlx; Hlx ¼ 1  K ; Hlx ¼ 0  KÞ ð1Þ
where l represents the label (blank, $, &).
– If both variables and label are equal (x¼y, lx¼ ly), then
H  K ¼ iteðlx; Hlx ¼ 1  Klx ¼ 1; Hlx ¼ 0  Klx ¼ 0Þ ð2Þ
– Three additional rules combine nodes with the same variable
but differently labelled. All possible combinations generate a
DF type variable, labelled as & (see proof in Appendix):
If H ¼ ite x; Hx ¼ 1; Hx ¼ 0ð Þ and K ¼ ite $x; K$x ¼ 1; K$x ¼ 0ð Þ then
H  K ¼ iteð&x; ðH j x ¼ 1  K j $x ¼ 0Þ; ðH j x ¼ 0  K j $x ¼ 1ÞÞ ð3aÞ
If H¼ ite &x; H&x ¼ 1; H&x ¼ 0ð Þ and K ¼ ite $x; K$x ¼ 1; K$x ¼ 0ð Þ then
H⊗K ¼ iteð&x; ðHj &x ¼ 1⊗K j $x ¼ 0Þ; ðHj&x ¼ 0⊗K j $x ¼ 1ÞÞ
ð3bÞ
If H¼ ite &x; H&x ¼ 1; H&x ¼ 0ð Þ and K ¼ ite x; Kx ¼ 1; Kx ¼ 0ð Þ then
H⊗K ¼ iteð&x; ðH j&x ¼ 1⊗K j x ¼ 1Þ; ðHj&x ¼ 0⊗K j x ¼ 0ÞÞ ð3cÞ
Finally, rules listed in Table 1 are applied to further reduce the
number of nodes with DF variables, when at least one of its
descendants is a terminal node (1 or 0).
Let &x be a DF variable associated with the node under
examination and F¼ ite(&x, H, K) the ite expression of the function
F ¼ x Hþx K .
The number of nodes with DF variables can further be reduced
if H¼1, 0 or K¼1, 0. To prove the reduction rules it is sufﬁcient to
simply perform the consensus and to simplify the resulting
expression. This generates a set of rules, listed in Table 1, to be
applied to nodes with at least one descendant equal to 1, 0.
2.3. Example
This example is taken from Liu and Pan [22]. ϕ xð Þ ¼ x2ðx1þ
x3þx4Þþx3ðx1þx2x4Þ is a non-monotonic function containing four
variables of DF type, i.e. each variable appears in positive and
negated form. Considering the ordering x2ox1ox3ox4 the L-BDD
is obtained as follows. First of all negated variables are labelled with
$, giving:
ϕ xð Þ ¼ x2 x1þ$x3þ$x4ð Þ½ þ x3 $x1þ$x2x4ð Þ½ :
It can be easily seen that the application of (1) is sufﬁcient to
obtain the following ite structures, indicated as H and K:
x2 x1þ$x3þ$x4ð Þ½  ¼ 4H ¼ ite x2;ite x1; 1; ite $x3; 1; ite $x4; 1; 0ð Þð Þð Þ; 0
  ð4aÞ
Fig. 3. Different L-BDDs generated according to different variables' ordering.
Table 1
Rules for reducing the number of nodes
with DF variables.
Equivalence rules
ite(&x, 0, 1)¼ ite($x, 1, 0)
ite(&x, 1, 0)¼ ite( x, 1, 0)
ite(&x, 0, K)¼ ite($x, K, 0)
ite(&x, 1, K)¼ ite( x, 1, K)
ite(&x, H, 0)¼ ite( x, H, 0)
ite(&x, H, 1)¼ ite($x, 1, H)
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x3 $x1þ$x2x4ð Þ½  ¼4K ¼ iteð$x2;ite $x1; ite x3;1; 0ð Þ;ð
ite x3; ite x4; 1; 0ð Þ;0ð ÞÞ; ite $x1; ite x3;1; 0ð Þ; 0ð ÞÞ ð4bÞ
The graphical representation of these functions is provided
respectively in Fig. 4(a) and (b).
The combination of x2 and $x2 requires the application of
Eq. (3a). Since:
Hx2 ¼ 1 ¼ ite x1; 1; ite $x3; 1; ite $x4; 1; 0ð Þð Þð ÞHx2 ¼ 0 ¼ 0
K$x2 ¼ 1 ¼ ite $x1; ite x3;1; 0ð Þ; ite x3; ite x4; 1; 0ð Þ;0ð Þð Þ
K$x2 ¼ 0 ¼ ite $x1; ite x3;1; 0ð Þ; 0ð ÞÞ⊗¼ ∨
Then, by applying Eq. (3a) (remember that x2¼1 is equivalent
to $x2¼0 and that x2¼0 is equivalent to $x2¼1): Top¼ ite(&x2,
(Hx2¼1 3 K$x2¼0), (Hx2¼0 3 K$x2¼1))
Analysis of the ﬁrst residue of the Top function: (Hx2¼1 3
K$x2¼0).
This residue represents the function ðx1þx3 þx4Þ þx1 x3,
which is equal to 1.
Indeed: Hx2¼1 3 K$x2¼0¼ ite(x1, 1, ite($x3, 1, ite($x4, 1, 0))) 3 ite
($x1, ite(x3,1, 0), 0))
The application of (3a) gives:
iteð&x1; 1; ite $x3; 1; ite $x4; 1; 0
  
3 ite x3;1; 0ð ÞÞ:
ite($x3, 1, ite($x4, 1, 0)) 3 ite(x3,1, 0) expanded with respect to x3
gives: ite(&x3, 1, 1)¼1
Therefore, Hx2¼1 3 K$x2¼0¼ ite(&x1, 1, 1)¼1
Analysis of the second residue of the Top function: (Hx2¼1 3
K$x2¼0)
This residue represents the function x1 x3þ x3x4 which
cannot be reduced.
Indeed: Hx2¼0 3 K$x2¼1¼ ite($x1, ite(x3,1, 0), ite(x3, ite(x4, 1, 0),0))
does not change since its Boolean expression does not contain x2.
Also the expansion with respect to x3 and x4 does not change
the ﬁnal result, given by:
Top¼ iteð&x2; 1; ite $x1; ite x3;1; 0ð Þ; ite x3; ite x4; 1; 0ð Þ; 0ð Þ
 Þ
Finally, since the ﬁrst descendant of the root node &x2 is 1,
according to Table 1 the label “&” can be removed. The resulting L-
BDD is represented in Fig. 5, from which the following considera-
tions can be drawn:
– Variables x2, x3 and x4 are represented in the L-BDD as SP
variables and only x1 is represented as SN variable. Therefore, in
spite of the fact that all variables in the fault tree are of DF type,
none of them is represented as such in the L-BDD. Differently
from a non-labelled BDD where at each node the intersection
between the left and right descendants must be performed,
this is never necessary on the LBDD in Fig. 5.
– The absence of DF variables in Fig. 5 assures that all implicants
are explicitly represented in the L-BDD. This can easily be
explained by observing that the Consensus operation, i.e.
x yþx z¼ y z is never necessary.
– Also the determination of the unconditional failure frequency
on classical BDD requires, for each node, the intersection
between the left and right descendants [22], whereas this is
not necessary on the LBDD in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4. LBDD representations of functions H (4a) and K (4b).
Fig. 5. L-BDD representations of Top¼ x2ðx1þx3þx4Þþx3ðx1þx2x4Þ .
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2.4. Experimental phase
For a set of non-coherent fault trees, Fig. 6 compares the
number of nodes with DF variables according to the static and
dynamic labelling [18].
As can be seen, the number of nodes with DF variables
identiﬁed by the dynamic labelling is generally less than 50% of
the number of nodes in case of static labelling.
2.5. Analysis of an L-BDD
On the generated L-BDD representation of the fault tree both
quantitative and qualitative analyses can be performed, namely:
1. Determination of the exact values of unavailability and failure
frequency or failure and repair probability of critical states of
basic events;
2. Construction of the L-ZBDD representation embedding Prime impli-
cants or Minimal Cut Sets, the latter referred to as P-Cuts in [6].
Truncation can also be applied to limit the analysis to the most
important PIs or MCSs
2.5.1. Probabilistic analysis
Given H¼ ite(lx H1, H0), the exact unavailability value is given by:
For SP and DF nodes : Q ¼ qxQ1þ 1qx
 
Q0 ð5aÞ
For SN nodes : Q ¼ 1qx
 
Q1þqxQ0 ð5bÞ
where Q1 and Q0 are respectively the unavailability of H1 and H0.
Also equations for determining the unconditional failure fre-
quency Ω(F) depend on the type of nodes, according to the L-BDD
deﬁnition of variables. The (unconditioned) failure frequency is
needed for determining the expected number of failures, which
also represents a conservative bound of the unreliability of
systems with repairable components.
For a generic node with SP variable x, the failure frequency is given by:
SP : Ω Fð Þ ¼Ω xH1þH0ð Þ ¼wxQ1þqxΩ1þΩ0wxP H1H0ð ÞqxΩ H1H0ð Þ
where Q1 ¼ P H1ð Þ; Q0 ¼ P H0ð Þ;Ω1 ¼Ω H1ð Þ andΩ0 ¼Ω H0ð Þ:
Since x is coherent, i.e. H1 H0¼H0, then:
ΩðxH1þH0Þ ¼wx Q1Q0ð ÞþqxðΩ1Ω0ÞþΩ0 ð6Þ
For a generic node with SN variable $x (note that $x is
characterised by the repair frequency νx and q$x¼ 1- qx) the
failure frequency is given by:
SN : Ω Fð Þ ¼Ω $xH1þH0ð Þ ¼ νxQ1þ 1qx
 
Ω1þΩ0νxP H1H0ð Þ– 1qx
 
Ω H1H0ð Þ:
Since $x is coherent, i.e. H1 H0¼ H0, then:
Ωð$xH1þH0Þ ¼ νx Q1Q0ð Þþ 1qx
  ðΩ1Ω0ÞþΩ0 ð7Þ
Given a generic node with DF variable &x, the failure frequency
is given by (consensus: H1 H0):
DF : Ω Fð Þ ¼Ω xH1þ$xH0þH1H0ð Þ ¼wxQ1þqxΩ1þνxQ0þ 1qx
 
Ω0þΩ H1H0ð Þ
wxP H1H0ð Þ–qxΩ H1H0ð ÞνxP H1H0ð Þ 1qx
 
Ω H1H0ð Þ; which reduces to :
¼wxQ1þqxΩ1þνxQ0þ 1qx
 
Ω0–ðwxþνxÞP H1H0ð Þ ð8Þ
It is clear that the application of (8) is more complex than
(6) and (7) due to the need to determine the consensus term (H1
H0).
The determination of the unconditional failure frequency can
also be based on the probability of critical states. Different
formulas are applied to the different types of variables, and also
in this case the complexity is greater for DF variables with respect
to the other two types.
2.5.2. Determination of prime implicants
Visiting the L-BDD in DFT mode, PIs are determined as follows
[6].
Let F¼ ite(lx, H, K) be the function with the labelled variable x as
root, where H¼ ite(lz, H1, H0), and K¼ ite(lw, K1, K0) its residues.
The combination of H and K generates the function
F¼HK. F is then minimised by subsuming H with respect to K
according to the following rules:
For coherent variables (SP, SN):
H\K ¼
ite lz; H1\K ; H0\Kð Þ if zow
H\K0 if woz
ite lz; H1\ K1þK0ð Þ; H0\K0ð Þ if z¼w

ð9Þ
For non coherent variables DFð Þ :
PI of ð&x Hþ&x KÞ ¼ x H\Cþx K\CþC; ð10Þ
where C is the consensus term (C¼HK)
Eq. (10) shows that the analysis of a DF variable requires the
determination of the consensus term; after this, the result is stored
as shown in Fig. 7.
2.5.3. Determination of Minimal Cut Sets (MCS)
In [6] it is recognised the practical convenience to determine
the approximated form of PIs, for which the authors proposed the
term P-Cuts. A P-Cut is a minimal failure combination (Minimal
Cut Set, MCS) made up only by the positive variables of a PI. This is
indeed the type of approximation that is usually adopted in system
safety. In the following MCS of non-coherent fault tree are also
used with the implicit meaning of P-Cuts.
When the determination of P-Cuts is of concern, it is conve-
nient to remove from the fault tree all negatively coherent variables
since they are not useful to remove impossible combinations. Let
$x be a negatively coherent variable. Rules to remove it from a
fault tree are very simple:
– if $x descends from an OR gate, then the gate is removed and its
output is set to 1; the value 1 is propagated upwards until the
ﬁrst AND gate encountered;
– if $x descends from an AND gate, then the event is removed.
From the L-BDD representation of the fault tree the set of P-
Cuts can be obtained as follows:
– Remove the & labels (&x-x)
– Apply (9) for subsuming SP variables;
– Delete SN variables ($ labelled) by performing the logical OR
between the two descending functions. Eq. (11) are applied to
remove “$” labels and to subsume;
F ¼
ite z; H1\K ; H0\Kð Þ if zow
ite w; H\K1; H\K0ð Þ ifwoz
ite z; H1\K1; H0\K0ð Þ if z¼w

ð11Þ
The result is a ZBDD embedding all MCS.
Fig. 7. Representation of prime implicants after the analysis of a DF variable.
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2.5.4. Application of truncation
The application of truncation is performed any time the
probability of the branch to be developed is lower than the
probabilistic threshold or the order is greater than the logical
threshold. This truncation procedure signiﬁcantly reduces both the
complexity of the generated ZBDD and the computation time.
When the determination of SMCS is the objective of the analysis
truncation can be applied but, to avoid the risk of removing
signiﬁcant combinations, the probability of negated variables must
be assumed as equal to 1. Consider for instance the combination
ab̄c having probability Q ab̄c¼qa qc (1qb). Suppose the probabil-
istic threshold is Plim¼qa qc. The truncation would erroneously
remove the non-signiﬁcant combination ab̄c, containing the sig-
niﬁcant MCS (a c).
2.5.5. Example
The following example shows the application of the rules for
determining prime implicants and P-Cuts. Consider the non-
coherent fault tree in Fig. 8. Its structure function, expressed in
terms of L-BDD, is Top¼a c $bþ$a (cþ$b d).
Based on the variable ordering aobocod, the L-BDD is
constructed by applying Eqs. (1), (2) and (3). The result is shown
in Fig. 9. From This L-BDD the exact probabilistic analysis can be
performed.
Table 2 describes the sequences (according to the DFT mode) of
operations applied to determine the disjunctive forms of prime
implicants. The result is the set of Prime Implicants
PI Fð Þ ¼ a b dþa cþb c:
Table 3 shows the sequence (according to the DFT mode) of
operations applied to determine the disjunctive forms of MCSs
from the L-BDD in Fig. 9. As can be seen the L-BDD construction
rules are applied to the fault tree of Fig. 8 after the removal of the
negatively coherent variable $b. After this the Top event is deﬁned
as Top¼a cþ$a (cþd).
Based on the variable ordering aocod, the application of
Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) gives the L-BDD shown in Fig. 10. Table 3
shows the steps for determining minimum P-Cuts (&x-x).
3. Construction of a Labelled ZBDD
This section is devoted to the description of the approach based
on the direct construction of the Labelled ZBDD for non-coherent
fault trees.
The quantiﬁcation of an L-ZBDD can be performed by means of the
application of the rare event approximation method. Depending on the
fault tree complexity with respect to the working memory dimension,
an L-ZBDD may be too large to be completed; hence the use of the
truncation technique is the way forward to solve the problem by
determining the TL-ZBDD embedding signiﬁcant PI or MCS. Unfortu-
nately, there remains the problem of estimating the truncation error, an
important issue which is outside the scope of the present paper.
With reference to Fig. 1, the described procedure is represented by
link 7.
Fig. 8. Test case: a non-coherent fault tree.
Fig. 9. L-BDD of the fault tree in Fig. 8.
Table 2
Determination of prime implicants from the L-BDD in Fig. 9.
node var P0 P1 P1\P0 C P0\C P1\C Expression
1 c 0 1 1 – – – c P1\P0þP0¼c
2 $b 0 c c – – – $b P1\P0þP0¼$b c
3 d 0 1 1 – – – d P1\P0þP0¼d
4 c d 1 1 – – – c P1\P0þP0¼cþd
5 c 0 1 1 – – – c P1\P0þP0¼c
6 $b c cþd d – – – $b P1\P0þP0¼$b dþc
7 &a $b d þc $b c – $b c $b d þc 0 a P1\Cþ$a P0\Cþ C¼$a $b dþ$a cþ$b c
Table 3
Determination of Minimal Cut Sets from the L-BDD in Fig. 10.
node var P0 P1 P1\P0 P0\P1 Expression
1 c 0 1 1 – c P1\P0þP0¼c
2 d 0 1 1 – d P1\P0þP0¼d
3 c d 1 1 – c P1\P0þP0¼cþd
4 a cþd c 1 – a P1\P0þP0¼aþcþd
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3.1. ZBDD construction for coherent fault trees
The set of expansion formulas, developed by Jung et al. [7,8], for
coherent fault trees, are provided in Table 4.
Let H¼ ite(x, H1, H0) and K¼(y, K1, K0) the ite representation of
coherent logical functions H¼ x H1þH0 and K¼ y K1þK0. By visiting
the fault tree in DFT mode the ZBDD is constructed by applying
formulas in Table 4 and performing the subsuming operations (9).
Truncation, when requested, is applied before subsuming.
3.2. Labelled ZBDD for the construction and analysis of non-coherent
fault trees
In this section a dynamic labelling method and construction
rules of a Labelled ZBDD for non-coherent fault trees is described,
followed by the probabilistic analysis and the determination of PI
or MCS. As with the L-BDD case, if the objective is the determina-
tion of MCSs then negatively coherent variables are removed from
the fault tree; moreover the truncation (if requested) is applied
assuming probability 1 to negated variables.
Visiting the fault tree in DFT mode, the L-ZBDD is constructed
through the application of relationships provided in Table 5; the
truncation (based on cut set probability, or order or both) and
subsuming are applied as new nodes are generated when con-
sidering AND gates and the Top gate of the fault tree. Moreover, if
MCS calculation is requested instead of PI, truncation is performed
by setting to 1 the probability of negated variables. Note that
truncation may produce situations in which the 1 branch or the
0 branch or both are 0; when this happens for DF variables, the
associated label changes according to the content of Table 1.
Concerning SP and SN variables, it is easy to see that the following
rules apply: ite(x, 0, G)¼G and ite($x, 0, G)¼G.
During the L-ZBDD construction subsuming is applied after
truncation (i.e. when AND gates are considered), except on node
with &-type variables for which subsuming is applied later, when
PI or MCS are determined.
On the complete L-ZBDD, the probabilistic analysis is per-
formed. The determination of unavailability and failure frequency
can be performed either using the rare event approximation
method for non-coherent fault trees or the same method applied
to BDD (Eq. (5)–(8)). In the latter case the result is not exact, but is
less conservative that the former.
After the probabilistic quantiﬁcation, PI or MCS are determined.
For each node the algorithm to be applied depends on the type of
associated variable to the node (SP, SN and DF) and the objective of
the analysis (PI or MCS) according to the following rules:
– PI: if x is coherent (SP or SN) then apply Eq. (9), otherwise Eq.
(10);
– MCS: if x is coherent (SP or SN) then Eq. (9), otherwise Eq. (11).
3.3. Example
The following example has the aim to directly determine the
set of PI of the fault tree in Fig. 8. Based on the variable ordering
aobocod, the L-ZBDD is constructed by applying rules in
Table 5. The generic rule is identiﬁed by both a capital letter (A–
G) and a small letter (a and b).
Visiting the fault tree in depth ﬁrst mode the L-BDD is
constructed as shown in Table 6. Subsuming is applied when
gates AND and the Top gate are analysed.
The resulting L-ZBDD, embedding all PIs is provided in Fig. 11.
4. Experimental results
Experimental results have been obtained by using the ASTRAþ
package for fault tree analysis (both coherent and non-coherent),
developed by the authors to cope with the analysis of fault trees of
any complexity. It contains three different analysis methods based
on Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD). With reference to Fig. 1 the
ﬁrst method implements the classical analysis sequence 1-2-3.
However, when the available working memory is not sufﬁcient to
store the BDD nodes, the T-ZBDD module (T-LZBDD for non-
coherent trees) can be applied. In this case upper and lower
bounds of the top-event unavailability can be calculated after
reaching the steady state (SS) condition. When the SS cannot be
reached - due to the very high fault tree complexity - then the
Fig. 10. Approximated L-ZBDD of the fault tree in Fig. 8 for MCS calculation.
Table 4
Formulas for direct construction of a ZBDD for coherent function.
Combination H and K H or K
xoy iteðx;H1 : K ;H0 : KÞ iteðx;H1 ;H0þKÞ
x¼y iteðx;H1ðK1þK0ÞþH0 : K1 ;H0 : K0Þ iteðx;H1þK1 ;H0þK0Þ
Table 5
L-ZBDD construction rules of non-coherent fault trees for PI determination.
Relationship H and K (a) H or K (b)
A x with y (xoy) ite(x, H1 K, H0 K) ite(x, H1þK, H0 þK)
B x with $x ite(&x, H1 K0þ H0 K0, H0 K1þ H0 K0) ite(&x, H1þ H0 þK0,K1þ H0 þK0)
C &x with x ite(&x, H1 K0þ H1 K1, H0 K0) ite(&x, H1þK0þK1, H0 þK0)
D &x with $x ite(&x, H1 K0, H0 K1þ H0 K0) ite(&x, H1þK0, H0þK0þK1)
E x with x iteðx;H1ðK1þK0ÞþH0 : K1 ;H0 : K0Þ iteðx;H1þK1;H0þK0Þ
F $x with $x iteð$x;H1ðK1þK0ÞþH0 : K1 ;H0 : K0Þ iteð$x;H1þK1 ;H0þK0Þ
G &x with &x iteð&x;H1 : K1;H0 : K0Þ iteð&x;H1þK1 ;H0þK0Þ
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functional decomposition method is applied, i.e. the complex fault
tree is decomposed into a set of mutually exclusive simpler fault
trees. The decomposition is repeatedly applied until the generated
trees are sufﬁciently simple to be analysed with the available
working memory dimension [15]. The functional decomposition
method enables exact probabilistic analysis of fault trees of any
complexity. In case of time constrains decomposition analysis can
be coupled with cut-off technique [14] leading to the determina-
tion of upper and lower bounds.
This section shows the results of the application of the TL-ZBDD
method to some non-coherent fault trees. The analysis involved fault
trees of different complexity in order to show the applicability of the
method. Some of the complex fault trees used for testing purposes are
listed in Table 7.
For veriﬁcation purposes, exact unavailability values for all fault
trees were obtained.
Table 8 provides the results obtained from the analysis of all
trees by applying different probabilistic cut-off values. For each
fault tree, the number of MCS, the peak size of the ITE table (which
can be used as an indicator of the dimension of the memory usage)
and run times are also provided. The parameter D% represents the
percentage increase of the k-th Top-event unavailability value due
to the reduction of Plim of one order of magnitude, i.e.
D%¼QkQk1
Qk1
100
As can be seen, the signiﬁcant MCS (PMCS4Plim) for large fault trees
can be determined in a reasonable amount of time and with limited
memory space. The obtained TL-ZBDD embedding the SMCS is then
used for the determination of the approximate Top event unavail-
ability. This can be done by sufﬁciently decreasing the probabilistic
cut-off value Plim until a Steady State Unavailability condition is
achieved. In this case both upper and lower bounds can be determined
as follows:
For the generic node equation F ¼ x F1þx F0:
– QUB¼qx Q1þQ0qx Q1 Q0;
– QLB¼qx Q1þQ0qx Q0
where qx, Q1, and Q0 are respectively the probability of x, F1 and F0.
The use of the ite records cache during the L-BDD constructions
signiﬁcantly increases the computational speed. However, this is
not the case with the TL-ZBDD. This is mainly due to the
application of the cut-off to the TL-ZBDD structure leading to
obsolescence of cached records. Every time the record is retrieved
from the cache it must be checked for correctness: either it should
be truncated or invalidated and constructed fully from scratch.
This signiﬁcantly reduces the efﬁciency of caching during the
construction of TL-ZBDD. Possible ways to improve caching are
still under investigation.
Truncation is an expensive operation in the terms of timing. When
the cache record is retrieved, it can be truncated immediately or at a
later stage (e.g. truncation can be performed after processing of each
gate). Immediate truncation of cached records increases runtime, but
the resulting ite records table size is smaller. Truncation at a later
stage (i.e. after processing the gate) leads to an increased ite table size
(more cut sets than required are generated), but allows for reduction
of run-time. During the tests both truncation versions were tested.
Test results showed that in case of immediate truncation, the ite size
required could be up to 30% smaller but the run-time increase as a
result of this was in the 20–40% range.
5. Conclusions
In this paper the main rules and algorithms for the analysis of large
non-coherent fault trees (coherent trees can be considered as a particular
case) based on the BDD approach have been provided.
Since non-coherent fault trees contain different types of vari-
ables (SP, SN, and DF) for which algorithms of different cost (in
terms of computational resources) are required, an algorithm for
dynamically labelling each BDD node with the variables' type was
deﬁned and implemented. The resulting Labelled BDD (L-BDD) has
the same dimension of the classical BDD with the addition of the
information about the variable type. This allows limiting the
Table 6
Steps for constructing the TL-ZBDD embedding PIs for the fault tree in Fig. 10.
Gate Expression Rule Resulting ite expression
G1 (BS, AS) a c $b Aa ite(a, ite($b, ite(c,1,0),0),0)
G4 (BS, AS) d $b Aa ite($b, ite(d,1,0),0)
G3 cþG4 Ab ite($b, ite(d,1,0),ite(c,1,0))
G2 (BS, AS) $a G3 Aa ite($a, ite($b, ite(d,1,0), ite(c, 1,0)), 0)
Top (BS) G1þG2 Bb ite(&a,ite($b, ite(c, 1, ite(d,1,0)), 0), ite($b, ite(d,1,0), ite(c, 1,0)), 0)
Top (AS) Consensus: ite($b, ite(c,1,ite(d,1,0)),0)
L-ZBDD¼ ite($a, ite($b, ite(d,1,0), ite(c,1,0)), ite($b, ite(c,1,0),0))
BS¼before subsuming; AS¼after subsuming
Fig. 11. L-ZBDD for the fault tree in Fig. 8 embedding all PIs.
Table 7
Fault trees used for the TL-ZBDD testing.
Fault tree Number of gates Number events Qexact Type
FT1 186 244 7.5345E-04 Non-coherent
FT2 132 215 1.1187E-01 Non-coherent
FT3 165 392 2.5545E-01 Non-coherent
FT4 229 585 3.6302E-01 Non-coherent
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application of the most complex analysis algorithms only to nodes
with DF variables.
The reduction in the number of nodes with DF variables implies
a decrease in the working memory due to the reduction in the
number of intersections to be calculated for determining the prime
implicants and the failure and repair frequencies.
Unfortunately, the number of nodes of a BDD increases exponentially
with the complexity of the fault tree. Therefore on very complex fault
trees (e.g. sequences of event trees of nuclear power plants) sometimes
theworkingmemory is not sufﬁcient to store the large generated L-BDD.
In these cases it is useful to limit the analysis to the most important
failure combinations (SMCS), which is generally a small percentage of
the total number of MCS. The direct construction of the ZBDD embed-
ding only SMCS is a useful analysis method, in spite of the need to
analyse the fault tree two or more times with lower Plim values until the
steady state condition is reached. In our implementation the proposed
value of D% gives an indication of how far the calculated Top-event
probability is from the steady state condition.
Appendix
Proof of formula (3a)
Given H¼ ite(x, H1, H0) and K¼ ite($x, K1, K0) implementing the
functions H¼x H1þ$x H0 and K ¼ $x K1þ$x K0, then:
H  K ¼ iteð&x; ðHj x ¼ 1  K j $x ¼ 0Þ; ðHj x ¼ 0  K j $x ¼ 1ÞÞ
Indeed:
H  K ¼ iteð&x; ðH  KÞj&x ¼ 1; ðH  KÞj&x ¼ 0Þ ¼
¼ iteð&x; ðHj&x ¼ 1  K j&x ¼ 1Þ; ðH j&x ¼ 0  K j &x ¼ 0ÞÞ
Now, considering that:
&x¼ 1) x¼ 1 and &x¼ 0; i:e: $x¼ 0; and
&x¼ 0) x¼ 0 and &x¼ 1; i:e: $x¼ 1:
Substituting &x¼1 with the couple x¼1; $x¼0 and &x¼0 with
the couple
x¼0, $x¼1, then:
H  K ¼ iteð&x; ðHj x ¼ 1; $x ¼ 0  K j x ¼ 1; $x ¼ 0Þ;
ðHj x ¼ 0; $x ¼ 1  K j x ¼ 0; $x ¼ 1ÞÞ:
Considering the adopted ordering &xoxo$x, K does not
contain x; the fact that any combination between x and $x
generates &x, H cannot contain $x, hence Eq. (3a) follows.
In a similar way also Eqs. (3b) and (3c) can easily be proved.
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Table 8
TL-ZBDD benchmark test results (application of Plim).
Fault Trees Plim QUB QLB D% # of MCS Peak itea Run-timeb, s
FT1 1.0E-04 7.1983E-04 2.3994E-04 – 3 1056 1.2
1.0E-08 7.6306E-04 7.1888E-04 6.0 754 2055 1.3
1.0E-12 7.6318E-04 7.3254E-04 0.01 8760 2957 1.5
FT2 1.0E-07 1.3107E-01 6.5612E-02 – 58082 12405 2
1.0E-09 1.3264E-01 6.5830E-02 1.2 29,2108 18,332 2.5
1.0E-11 1.3266E-01 6.8740E-02 0.02 69,8456 22,665 5
FT3 1.0E-04 4.6028E-01 1.4525E-01 – 141 1800 1
1.0E-05 4.6535E-01 1.6221E-01 1.1 251 2148 2
1.0E-06 4.6611E-01 1.6335E-01 0.16 441 2345 2
FT4 1.0E-04 6.7935E-02 6.7935E-02 – 7 4036 1.5
1.0E-05 7.2587E-02 7.0736E-02 6.85 257 14,123 16
1.0E-06 4.6760E-01 2.8268E-01 5.44 891,341 21,900 65
1.0E-07 4.6760E-01 2.8268E-01 0.0 89,1341 21,900 65
a ite table is used as a cache (i.e. all the generated ite records were kept during TL-ZBDD construction phase).
b Intel Core i5 2.4 GHz CPU, 8 Gb RAM, Windows 7 (64-bits).
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